The recent adoption of blockchain technologies and open permissionless networks suggest the importance of peer-to-peer atomic cross-chain transaction protocols. Users should be able to atomically exchange tokens and assets without depending on centralized intermediaries such as exchanges. Recent peer-to-peer atomic cross-chain swap protocols use hashlocks and timelocks to ensure that participants comply to the protocol. However, an expired timelock could lead to a violation of the all-or-nothing atomicity property. An honest participant who fails to execute a smart contract on time due to a crash failure or network delays at her site might end up losing her assets. Although a crashed participant is the only participant who ends up worse off, current proposals are unsuitable for atomic cross-chain transactions in asynchronous environments where crash failures and network delays are the norm. In this paper, we present AC 3 WN, the first decentralized all-or-nothing atomic cross-chain commitment protocol. The redeem and refund events of the smart contracts that exchange assets are modeled as conflicting events. An open permissionless network of witnesses is used to guarantee that conflicting events could never simultaneously occur and either all smart contracts in an atomic cross-chain transaction are redeemed or all of them are refunded.
Introduction
The wide adoption of permissionless open blockchain networks by both industry (e.g., Bitcoin [22] , Ethereum [28] , etc) and academia (e.g., Bzycoin [18] , Elastico [19] , BitcoinNG [11] , Algorand [21] , etc) suggest the importance of developing protocols and infrastructures that support peer-to-peer atomic cross-chain transactions. Users, who usually do not trust each other, should be able to directly exchange their tokens and assets that are stored on different blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) without depending on trusted third party intermidiaries. Decentralized permissionless [20] blockchain ecosystems require infrastructure enablers and protocols that allow users to atomically exchange tokens without giving up trust-free decentralization, the main reasons behind using permissionless blockchain. We motivate the problem of atomic cross-chain transactions and discuss the current available solutions and their limitations through the following example.
Suppose Alice owns X bitcoins and she wants to exchange them for Y ethers. Luckily, Bob owns ether and he is willing to exchange his Y ethers for X bitcoins. In this example, Alice and Bob want to atomically exchange assets that reside in different blockchains. In addition, both Alice and Bob do not trust each other and in many scenarios, they might not be co-located to do this atomic exchange in person. Current infrastructures do not support these direct peer-to-peer transactions. Instead, both Alice and Bob need to independently exchange their tokens through a trusted centralized exchange, Trent (e.g., Coinbase [3] and Robinhood [4] ) either through fiat currency or directly. Using Fiat, both Alice and Bob first exchange their tokens with Trent for a fiat currency (e.g., USD) and then use the earned fiat currency to buy the other token also from Trent or from another trusted exchange. Alternatively, some exchanges (e.g., Coinbase) allow their customers to directly exchange tokens (ether for bitcoin or bitcoin for ether) without going through fiat currencies.
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These solutions have many drawbacks that make them unacceptable solutions for atomic peer-to-peer cross-chain transactions. First, both solutions require both Alice and Bob to trust Trent. This centralized trust requirement risks to derail the whole idea of blockchain's trust-free decentralization [22] . Second, both solutions require Trent to trade in all involved resources (e.g., bitcoin and ether). This requirement is unrealistic especially if Alice and Bob want to exchange commodity resources (e.g., transfer a car ownership for bitcoin assuming car titles are stored in a blockchain [16, 29] ). Third, both solutions do not achieve atomicity of the transaction among the involved participants. Alice might trade her bitcoin directly for ether or through a fiat currency while Bob has no obligation to execute his part of the swap. Finally, both solutions significantly increase the number of required transactions to achieve the intended cross-chain transaction, and hence drastically increases the imposed fees. One cross-chain transaction between Alice and Bob results in either four transactions (two between Alice and Trent and two between Bob and Trent) if fiat is used or at best two transactions (one between Alice and Trent and one between Bob and Trent) if assets are directly swapped.
An Atomic Cross-Chain Transaction 1 , AC 2 T, is a distributed transaction that spans multiple blockchains. This distributed transaction consists of sub-transactions and each sub-transaction is executed on some blockchain. An Atomic Cross-Chain Commitment, AC 3 , protocol is required to execute AC 2 Ts. This protocol is a variation of traditional distributed atomic commitment protocols (e.g., 2PC [8, 14] ). This protocol should guarantee both atomicity and commitment of AC 2 Ts. Atomicity ensures the all-or-nothing property where either all sub-transactions take place or none of them is executed. Commitment guarantees that any changes caused by a cross-chain transaction must eventually take place if the transaction is decided to commit. Unlike in 2PC and other traditional distributed atomic commitment protocols, atomic cross-chain commitment protocols are also trust-free and therefore must tolerate maliciousness [16] .
A two-party atomic cross-chain swap protocol was originally proposed by Nolan [1, 23] and generalized by Herlihy [16] to process multi-party atomic cross-chain swaps. Both Nolan's protocol and its generalization by Herlihy use smart contracts, hashlocks, and timelocks to execute atomic cross-chain swaps. A smart contract is a self executing contract (or a program) that gets executed in a blockchain once all the terms of the contract are satisfied. A hashlock is a cryptographic one-way hash function h = H(s) that locks assets in a smart contract until a hash secret s is provided. A timelock is a time bounded lock that triggers the execution of a smart contract function after a pre-specified time period.
The atomic swap between Alice and Bob, explained in the earlier example, is executed using Nolan's protocol as follows. Let a participant be the leader of the swap, say Alice. Alice creates a secret s, only known to Alice, and a hashlock h = H(s). Alice uses h to lock X bitcoins in a smart contract SC 1 and publishes SC 1 in the Bitcoin network. SC 1 states to transfer X bitcoins to Bob if Bob provides the secret s such that h = H(s) to SC 1 . In addition, SC 1 is locked with a timelock t 1 that refunds the X bitcoins to Alice if Bob fails to provide s to SC 1 before t 1 expires. As SC 1 is published in the Bitcoin network and made public to everyone, Bob can verify that SC 1 indeed transfers X bitcoins to the public address of Bob if Bob provides s to SC 1 . In addition, Bob learns h from SC 1 . Using h, Bob publishes a smart contract SC 2 in the Ethereum network that locks Y ethers in SC 2 using h. SC 2 states to transfer Y ethers to Alice if Alice provides the secret s to SC 2 . In addition, SC 2 is locked with a timelock t 2 < t 1 that refunds the Y ethers to Bob if Alice fails to provide s to SC 2 before t 2 expires. Now, if Alice wants to redeem her Y ethers from SC 2 , Alice must reveal s to SC 2 before t 2 expires. Once s is provided to SC 2 , Alice redeems the Y ethers and s gets revealed to Bob. Now, Bob can use s to redeem his X bitcoins from SC 1 before t 1 expires. Notice that t 1 > t 2 is a necessary condition to ensure that Bob has enough time to redeem his X bitcoins from SC 1 after Alice provides s to SC 2 and before t 1 expires. If Bob provides s to SC 1 before t 1 expires, Bob successfully redeems his X bitcoins and the atomic swap is marked completed.
The case against the current proposals: if Bob fails to provide s to SC 1 before t 1 expires due to a crash failure or a network partitioning at Bob's site, Bob loses his X bitcoins and SC 1 refunds the X bitcoins to Alice. This violation of the atomicity property of the protocol penalizes Bob for a failure that happens out of his control. Although a crashed participant is the only participant who ends up being worse off (Bob in this example), this protocol does not guarantee the atomicity of AC 2 Ts in asynchronous environments where crash failures, network partitioning, and message delays are the norm.
Another important drawback in Nolan's and Herlihy's protocols is the requirement of sequentially publishing the smart contracts in an atomic swap before the leader (Alice in our example) reveals the secret s. This requirement is necessary to ensure that the publishing events of all the smart contracts in the atomic swap happen before the redemption of any of the smart contracts. This causality requirement ensures that any malicious participant who declines to publish a smart contract does not take advantage of the protocol. However, the sequential publishing of smart contracts, especially in atomic swaps that include many participants, proportionally increases the latency of the swap to the number of sequentially published contracts.
In this paper, we propose AC 3 WN, the first decentralized all-or-nothing Atomic Cross-Chain Commitment protocol that uses an open Witness Network. The redemption and the refund events of smart contracts in AC 2 T are modeled as conflicting events. A decentralized open network of witnesses is used to guarantee that conflicting events must never simultaneously take place and either all smart contracts in an AC 2 T are redeemed or all of them are refunded. Unlike in Nolan's and Herlihy's protocols, AC 3 WN allows all participants to concurrently publish their contracts in a swap resulting in a drastic decrease in an atomic swap's latency. Our contribution is summarized as follows:
• We present AC 3 WN, the first all-or-nothing atomic cross-chain commitment protocol. AC 3 WN is decentralized and does not require to trust any centralized intermediary.
• We prove the correctness of AC 3 WN showing that AC 3 WN achieves both atomicity and commitment of AC 2 Ts.
• Finally, we analytically evaluate AC 3 WN in comparison to Herlihy's [16] protocol. Unlike in Herlihy's protocol where the latency of an atomic swap proportionally increases as the number of the sequentially published smart contracts in the atomic swap increases, our analysis shows that the latency of an atomic swap in AC 3 WN is constant irrespective of the number of smart contracts involved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the open blockchain data and transactional models. Section 3 explains the cross-chain distributed transaction model and Section 4 presents our atomic cross-chain commitment protocol. An analysis of the atomic cross-chain commitment protocol is presented in Section 5. The protocol is evaluated in Section 6 and the paper is concluded in Section 7.
2 Open Blockchain Models
Architecture Overview
An open permissionless blockchain system [20] (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum) typically consists of two layers: a storage layer and an application layer as illustrated in Figure 1 . The storage layer comprises a decentralized distributed ledger managed by an open network of computing nodes. A blockchain system is permissionless if computing nodes can join or leave the network of its storage layer at any moment without obtaining a permission from a centralized authority. Each computing node, also called a miner, maintains a copy of the ledger. The ledger is a tamper-proof chain of blocks, hence named blockchain. Each block contains a set of valid transactions that transfer assets among end-users. The application layer comprises end-users who communicate with the storage layer via message passing through a client library. End-users have identities, defined by their public keys, and signatures, generated using their private keys. Digital signatures are the end-users' way to generate transactions as explained later in Section 2.3. End-users submit their transactions to the storage layer through a client library. Transactions are used to transfer assets from one identity to another. End-users multicast their transaction messages to mining nodes in the storage layer. A mining node validates the transactions it receives and valid transactions are added to the current block of a mining node. Miners run a consensus protocol through mining to agree on the next block to be added to the chain. A miner who mines a block gets the right to add its block to the chain and multicasts it to other miners. To make progress, miners accept the first received mined block after verifying it and start mining the next block 2 . Sections 2.2 and 2.3 explain the data model and the transactional model of open blockchain systems respectively.
Data Model
The storage layer stores the ownership information of assets in the system in the blockchain. The ownership is determined through identities and identities are typically implemented using public keys. For example, the Bitcoin blockchain stores the information of the most recent owner of every bitcoin in the Bitcoin blockchain. A bitcoin that is linked to Alice's public key is owned by Alice. In addition, the blockchain stores transactions that transfer the ownership of an asset from one identity to another. Therefore, an asset can be tracked from its registration in the blockchain, the first owner, to its last owner in the blockchain. In the Bitcoin network, new bitcoins are generated and registered in the Bitcoin blockchain through mining. Asset ownership is transferred from one identity to another through a transaction. In addition, transactions are used to merge or split assets as explained in Section 2.3. A transaction is a digital signature that transfers the ownership of assets from one identity to another. End-users, in the application layer, use their private keys [26] to digitally sign assets linked to their identity to transfer these assets to other identities, identified by their public keys. These digital signatures are submitted to the storage layer via message passing through a client library. It is the responsibility of the miners to validate that end-users can transact only on their own assets. If an end-user digitally signs an asset that is not owned by this end-user, the resulting transaction is not valid and is rejected by the miners. In addition, miners validate that an asset cannot be spent twice and hence prevent double spending of assets.
Transaction Model
A transaction takes one or more input assets owned by one identity and results in one or more output assets where each output asset is owned by one identity. Therefore, transactions are used to merge or split assets. Figure 2 shows two transactions T X 1 , a transaction that merges assets, and T X 2 , a transaction that splits assets. T X 1 takes 3 input assets owned by Alice, merges them into one output asset, and transfers the ownership of this merged asset to Bob. On the other hand, T X 2 takes one input asset owned by Bob and splits it into 2 output assets of two different values; one is transferred to Alice and the other is transferred to Bob. Note that the summation of a transaction's input assets matches the summation of its output assets assuming that no transaction fees are imposed. Figure 3 shows an example of how T X 1 and T X 2 take place in the Bitcoin blockchain. As shown, Alice can only transact on assets that she owns in previous blocks in the blockchain issuing T X 1 . Similarly, once the ownership of 1.8 bitcoin is transferred to Bob, only then can Bob issue the transaction T X 2 to split the 1.8 bitcoin asset to 0.3 to Alice and 1.5 to Bob in a following block. In traditional databases, end-user transactions execute arbitrary updates in the storage layer as long as the semantic and the access control rights of a transaction are validated in the application layer. On the other hand, in blockchain systems, this validation is explicitly enforced in the storage layer and hence end-users, in the application layer, are allowed to transact only on assets they own in the storage layer.
Another way to perform transactions in blockchain systems is through smart contracts. A smart contract is a program written in some scripting language (e.g., Solidity for Ethereum smart contracts [5] ) that allows general program executions on a blockchain's mining nodes. End-users deploy a smart contract in a blockchain through a deployment 3 message, msg, that is sent to the mining nodes in the storage layer. The deployment message includes the smart contract code in addition to some implicit parameters that are accessible to the smart contract code once the smart contract is deployed. These parameters include the sender end-user public key, accessed through msg.sender, and an optional asset value, accessed through msg.val. This optional asset value allows end-users to lock some of their assets in the deployed smart contract. Like transactions, a smart contract is deployed in a blockchain if it is included in a mined block in this blockchain. We adopt Herlihy's notion of a smart contract as an object in programming languages [10, 17] . A smart contract has a state, a constructor that is called when a smart contract is first deployed in the blockchain, and a set of functions that could alter the state of the smart contract. The constructor initializes the smart contract's state and uses the implicit parameters to initialize the owner of the smart contract and the assets to be locked in this smart contract. Miners verify that the end-user who deploys a smart contract indeed owns these assets. Once assets are locked in a smart contract, their owners cannot transact on these assets outside the smart contract logic until these assets are unlocked from the smart contract as a result of a smart contract function call. To execute a smart contract function, end-users submit their function call accompanied by the function parameters through messages to miners. These messages could include implicit parameters as well (e.g., msg.sender). Miners execute 4 the function on the current contract state and record any contract state changes in their current block in the blockchain. Therefore, a smart contract state might span many blocks after the block where the smart contract is first deployed.
3 Atomic Cross-Chain Transaction Model An Atomic Cross-Chain Transaction, AC 2 T, is a distributed transaction to transfer the ownership of assets stored in multiple blockchains among two or more participants. This distributed transaction consists of sub-transactions and each sub-transaction transfers an asset on some blockchain. An AC 2 T is modeled using a directed graph D = (V, E) [16] where V is the set of vertexes and E is the set of edges in D. V represents the participants in AC 2 T and E represents the sub-transactions in AC 2 T. A directed edge e = (u, v) ∈ E represents a sub-transaction that transfers an asset e.a from a source participant u ∈ V to a recipient participant v ∈ V in some blockchain e.BC. Figure 4 shows an example of an AC 2 T graph between Alice (A) and Bob (B). As shown, the edge (A, B) represents the sub-transaction AC 2 T 1 that transfers X bitcoins from A to B while the edge (B, A) represents the sub-transaction AC 2 T 2 that transfers Y ethers from B to A.
An atomic cross-chain commitment protocol is required in order to correctly execute an AC 2 T. This protocol must ensure the atomicity and the commitment of all sub-transactions in AC 2 T as follows.
• Atomicity: either all asset transfers of all sub-transactions in the AC 2 T take place or none of them does.
• Commitment: once the atomic cross-chain commitment protocol decides the commitment of an AC 2 T, all asset transfers of all sub-transactions in this AC 2 T must eventually take place.
An atomic cross-chain commitment protocol is a variation of the two phase commit protocol (2PC) [8, 14] . Therefore, we use the analogy of 2PC to explain an abstraction of an atomic cross-chain commitment protocols. In 2PC, a distributed transaction spans multiple data partitions and each partition is responsible for executing a sub-transaction. A coordinator sends a vote request to all involved data partitions. Upon receiving a vote request, a data partition votes back yes only if it succeeds in executing all the operations of its sub-transaction on the involved data objects. Otherwise, a data partition votes no to the coordinator. A coordinator decides to commit a distributed transaction if all involved data partitions vote yes, otherwise it decides to abort the distributed transaction. If a commit decision is reached, all data partitions commit their sub-transactions. However, if an abort decision is reached, data partitions abort their sub-transactions. 2PC assumes that the coordinator and the data partitions are trusted. The main challenge in blockchain systems is how to design a trust-free variation of 2PC where end-user participants do not trust each other and a protocol cannot depend on a centralized trusted coordinator.
An atomic cross-chain commitment protocol requires that for every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, the source participant u to lock an asset e.a in Blockchain e.BC. This asset locking is necessary to temporarily prevent the participant u from spending e.a through other transactions in e.BC. If every source participant u locks e.a in e.BC, the atomic cross-chain commitment protocol can decide to commit the AC 2 T. Once the protocol decides to commit the AC 2 T, every recipient participant v should be able to redeem the asset e.a. However, if the protocol decides to abort the AC 2 T because some participants do not comply to the protocol or a participant requests the transaction to abort, every source participant u should be able to refund their locked assets e.a.
In blockchain systems, smart contracts are used to implement this logic. Participant u deploys a smart contract SC e in Blockchain e.BC to lock an asset e.a owned by u in SC e . SC e ascertains to conditionally transfer e.a to v if a commitment decision is reached, otherwise e.a is refunded to u. A smart contract SC e exists in one of three states: published (P ), redeemed (RD), or refunded (RF ). A smart contract SC e is published if it gets deployed to e.BC by u. Publishing the smart contract SC e serves two important goals towards the atomic execution of an AC 2 T. First, it represents a yes vote on the sub-transaction corresponding to the edge e. Second, it locks the asset e.a in blockchain e.BC. A smart contract SC e is redeemed if participant v successfully redeems the asset e.a from SC e . Finally, a smart contract SC e is refunded if the asset e.a is refunded to participant u. Now, if for every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, participant u publishes smart contract SC e in e.BC, it means that all participants vote yes on AC 2 T, lock their involved assets in AC 2 T, and hence the AC 2 T can be committed. However, if some participants decline to publish their smart contracts, the AC 2 T has to be aborted. The commitment of AC 2 T requires the redemption of every smart contract SC e in AC 2 T. On the other hand, if the AC 2 T aborts, this requires the refund of every smart contract SC e in AC 2 T.
To implement conditional smart contract redemption and refund, a cryptographic commitment scheme primitive based on [12] is used. A commitment scheme allows a user to commit to some chosen value without revealing this value. Once this hidden value is revealed, other users can verify that the revealed value is indeed the one that is used in the commitment. A hashlock is an example of a commitment scheme. A hashlock is a cryptographic one-way hash function h = H(s) that is used to conditionally lock assets in a smart contract using h, the lock, until a hash secret s, the key, is revealed. Once s is revealed, everyone can verify that the lock h equals to H(s) and hence unlocks the assets locked in the smart contract.
An atomic cross-chain commitment protocol should ensure that smart contracts in AC 2 T are either all redeemed or all refunded. For this, a protocol uses two mutually exclusive commitment scheme instances: a redemption commitment scheme and a refund commitment scheme. All smart contracts in AC 2 T commit their redemption action to the redemption commitment scheme instance and their refund action to the refund commitment scheme instance. If the protocol decides to commit the AC 2 T, the protocol must publish the redemption commitment scheme secret. This allows all participants in AC 2 T to redeem their assets. However, if the protocol reaches an abort decision, the protocol must publish the refund commitment scheme secret. This allows participants in AC 2 T to refund the locked assets in every published smart contract. A protocol must ensure that once the secret of one commitment scheme instance is revealed, the secret of the other instance cannot be revealed. This guarantees the atomic execution of an AC 2 T. In Section 4, we instantiate different protocols that implement mutually exclusive redemption and refund commitment schemes in different ways.
Algorithm 1 illustrates a smart contract template that can be used in implementing an atomic cross-chain commitment protocol. Each smart contract has a sender s and recipient r (Line 2), an asset a (Line 3) to be transferred from s to r through the contract, a state (Line 4), and a redemption and refund commitment scheme instances rd and rf (Lines 5 and 6). A smart contract is published in a blockchain through a deployment message. When published, its constructor (Line 7) is executed to initialize the contract. The deployment message of a smart contract typically includes some implicit parameters like the sender's address (msg.sender, Line 8) and the asset value (msg.value, Line 9) to be locked in the contract. The constructor initializes the addresses, the asset value, the refund and redemption commitment schemes, and sets the contract state to P (Lines 8-11). this.s = msg.sender, this.r = r 9: this.a = msg.value 10: this.rd = rd, this.rf = rf 27: return verify(rf, s rf ) 28 : end procedure } In addition, each smart contract has a redeem function (Line 13) and a refund function (Line 18). A redeem function requires the smart contract to be in state P and that the provided commitment scheme secret is valid (Line 14). If all these requirements hold, the asset a is transferred from the contract to the recipient and the contract state is changed to RD (Lines 15-16). However, if any requirement is violated, the redeem function fails and the smart contract state is not changed.
Similarly, the refund function requires the smart contract to be in P state and that the provided commitment scheme secret is valid (Line 19). If all these requirements hold, the asset a is refunded from the contract to the sender and the contract state is changed to RF (Lines 20-21).
The redeem and the refund functions use two helper functions: IsRedeemable (Line 23) and IsRefundable (Line 26). IsRedeemable verifies that the provided redemption commitment scheme secret is valid and hence the smart contract can be redeemed. Similarly, IsRefundable verifies that the provided refund commitment scheme secret is valid and hence the smart contract can be refunded. In Section 4, we instantiate different versions of these two functions for every atomic cross-chain commitment protocol.
AC 3 : Atomic Cross-Chain Commitment
This section presents two Atomic Cross-Chain Commitment, AC 3 , protocols that achieve both atomicity and commitment of an AC 2 T. There are two main challenges in designing a correct AC 3 protocol. The first challenge is how to implement the redemption and refund commitment scheme instances used by every smart contract in AC 2 T. The second challenge is how to ensure that the two instances are mutually exclusive. If the secret of one instance is revealed, the secret of the other instance must never be revealed. First, we present AC 3 TW, an AC 3 protocol that uses a centralized Trusted Witness in Section 4.1. Then, we present AC 3 WN, an AC 3 protocol that replaces the centralized trusted witness with a permissionless Witness Network in Section 4.2. Using a permissionless network of witnesses does not require more trust in the witness network than the required trust in the blockchains used to exchange the assets in an AC 2 T. Furthermore, the AC 3 WN protocol overcomes the vulnerability of the centralized trusted witness, which may fail or be subject to denial of service attacks.
AC 3 TW: Centralized Trusted Witness
A centralized trusted witness, Trent, is leveraged to implement an AC 3 protocol as follows. For every AC 2 T, a directed graph D = (V, E) is constructed at some timestamp t and multisigned by all the participants in the set V generating a graph multisignature ms(D) as shown in Equation 1. The timestamp t is important to distinguish between identical AC 2 T s among the same participants. The order of participant signatures in ms(D) is not important. Any signature order indicates that all participants in the AC 2 T agree on the graph D at some timestamp t.
Afterwards, any participant in the set V registers ms(D) at Trent through a registration message. This indicates that participants in the AC 2 T trust Trent to witness their AC 2 T. Trent's identity is leveraged to implement the redemption and refund commitment scheme instances and Trent's digital signatures [26] are leveraged to implement their corresponding commitment scheme secrets. After ms(D) is registered at Trent, participants in the AC 2 T publish smart contracts in the AC 2 T in their corresponding blockchains. Participants set both the redemption and refund commitment scheme instances of their smart contracts to the pair (ms(D), P K T ) where P K T is Trent's public key. Trent's signatures T (ms(D), RD) and T (ms(D), RF ) are used to implement the redemption and refund commitment scheme secrets respectively. Once a signature of one commitment scheme secret is revealed (e.g., the redemption signature), the signature of the other commitment scheme secret cannot be issued (e.g., the refund signature). This guarantees that the redemption and refund commitment scheme secrets are mutually exclusive. Trent's signature T (ms(D), RD) implies that Trent witnessed the deployment of all smart contracts in the AC 2 T and hence the AC 2 T can be committed without violating atomicity. The AC 2 T is committed once Trent issues T (ms(D), RD). Afterwards, participants use T (ms(D), RD) to eventually redeem all the locked assets in the published smart contracts. Trent's signature T (ms(D), RF ) implies that the AC 2 T was not previously committed and hence can be aborted. The AC 2 T is aborted once Trent issues T (ms(D), RF ). Afterwards, participants use T (ms(D), RF ) to eventually refund all the locked assets in the published smart contracts. 3. Afterwards, Alice publishes a smart contract SC 1 using Algorithm 2 to the Bitcoin network stating the following:
• Move X bitcoins from Alice to Bob if Bob provides T (ms(D), RD).
• Refund X bitcoins from SC 1 to Alice if Alice provides T (ms(D), RF ).
4. Concurrently, Bob published a smart contract SC 2 to the Ethereum network using Algorithm 2 stating the following:
• Move Y ethers from Bob to Alice if Alice provides T (ms(D), RD).
• Refund Y ethers from SC 2 to Bob if Bob provides T (ms(D), RF ). This protocol achieves atomicity by ensuring that either T (ms(D), RD) or T (ms(D), RF ) can be issued. However, this solution requires the participants to trust a centralized intermediary, Trent, and hence risks to derail the whole idea of blockchain's trust-free decentralization [22] . In Section 4.2, we explain how to replace Trent with a permissionless network of witnesses.
AC 3 WN: Permissionless Witness Network
This section presents AC 3 WN, an AC 3 protocol that uses a permissionless blockchain network of witnesses to decide whether an AC 2 T should be committed or aborted. Miners of this blockchain are collectively the witnesses on AC 2 T s. The AC 3 WN protocol is designed to address the shortcoming of the AC 3 TW protocol that depends on a centralized trusted witness. The AC 3 TW protocol uses the trusted witness identity and signatures to implement the redemption and the refund commitment scheme instances of all smart contracts in the AC 2 T. In contrast, in AC 3 WN, it is infeasible to use a specific witness identity to implement the redemption and the refund commitment scheme instances. The witness network is permissionless. Therefore, the identities of all the miners, the witnesses, in this network are not necessarily known and hence cannot be used to implement these commitment scheme instances. Instead, when a set of participants want to execute an AC 2 T, they deploy a smart contract SC w in the witness network where SC w is used to coordinate the AC 2 T. SC w has a state that determines the state of the AC 2 T. SC w exists in one of three states: Published (P ), Redeem_Authorized (RD auth ), or Refund_Authorized (RF auth ). Once SC w is deployed, SC w is initialized to the state P . If the witness network decides to commit the AC 2 T, the witnesses set SC w 's state to RD auth . However, if the witness network decides to abort the AC 2 T, the witnesses set SC w 's state to RF auth . Figure 5 shows an AC 2 T that exchanges assets among blockchains, blockchain 1 , ..., blockchain n and uses a witness blockchain for coordination. Also, it illustrates the AC 3 WN protocol steps. For every AC 2 T, all the participants construct the directed graph D at some timestamp t and multisign it resulting in the multisignature ms(D). A participant registers ms(D) in a smart contract SC w in the witness network where SC w 's state is initialized to P . The state P indicates that the participants of the AC 2 T agreed on D. In addition, the participants agree to conditionally link the redeem and the refund actions of their smart contracts in the AC 2 T to SC w 's states RD auth and RF auth respectively. Afterwards, the participants parallelly deploy their smart contracts in the blockchains, blockchain 1 , ..., blockchain n , as shown in Figure 5 . After all the participants deploy their smart contracts in the AC 2 T, a participant may submit a state change request to the witness network miners to alter SC w 's state from P to RD auth . This request is accompanied by evidence that all smart contracts in the AC 2 T are deployed and correct. Upon receiving this request, the miners of the witness network verify that SC w 's state is P and that the participants of the AC 2 T have indeed deployed their smart contracts in the AC 2 T in their corresponding blockchains. In addition, the miners verify that all these smart contracts are in state P and that the redemption and the refund of these smart contracts are conditioned on SC w 's states RD auth and RF auth respectively. If this verification succeeds, the miners of the witness network record SC w 's state change to RD auth in their current block. Once a block that reflects the state change of SC w to RD auth is mined in the witness network, the commitment of the AC 2 T is decided and participants can use this block as a commitment evidence to redeem their assets in the smart contracts of the AC 2 T. The commit decision is illustrated in Figure 5 using the vertical dotted line.
Similarly, if some participants decline to deploy their smart contracts in the AC 2 T or a participant changes her mind before the commitment of the AC 2 T, a participant can submit a state change request to the witness network miners to alter SC w 's state from P to RF auth . The miners of the witness network only verify that SC w 's state is P . If this verification succeeds, the miners of the witness network record SC w 's state change to RF auth in their current block. Once a block that reflects the state change of SC w to RF auth is mined in the witness network, the AC 2 T is decided to abort and the participants can use this block as evidence of the abort to refund their assets in the deployed smart contracts of the AC 2 T. Note that SC w is programmed to ensure that SC w 's state can only be changed either from P to RD auth or from P to RF auth but no other state transition is allowed. This ensures that SC w 's states RD auth and RF auth are mutually exclusive. The details of evidence and how miners of one blockchain validate evidence in another blockchain without maintaining a copy of this other blockchain are explained in Section 4.3. Section 4.3 presents different implementations for evidence submission and validation. Algorithm 3 presents the details of SC w . SC w consists of four functions: Constructor (Line 5), AuthorizeRedeem (Line 10), AuthorizeRefund (Line 14), and VerifyContracts (Line 18). The Constructor initializes SC w with the participants public keys and the multisigned graph of the AC 2 T. This information is necessary to the witness network miners to later verify the publishing of all smart contracts in the AC 2 T. AuthorizeRedeem alters SC w 's state from P to RD auth . To call AuthorizeRedeem, a participant provides evidence that shows where the smart contracts of the AC 2 T are published (Line 10). AuthorizeRedeem first verifies that SC w 's state is currently P . In addition, AuthorizeRedeem verifies that all smart contract in the AC 2 T are published and correct through a VerifyContracts function call (Line 11). If this verification succeeds, SC w 's state is altered to RD auth (Line 12). On the other hand, AuthorizeRefund (Line 14) verifies only that the state of SC w is P (Line 15). If true, SC w 's state is altered to RF auth (Line 16).
VerifyContracts (Line 18) validates that all smart contracts in the AC 2 T are published and correct. For every edge e = (u, v) ∈ D.E, VerifyContracts finds a matching smart contract SC e in the participant evidence. VerifyContracts ensures that SC e matches its description in the edge e. If any parameter in SC e does not match its description in e, VerifyContracts fails and returns false (Line 22). However, if all smart contracts in the provided list are correct, VerifyContracts returns true (Line 20). VerifyContracts ensures that AuthorizeRedeem cannot be executed unless all smart contract in the AC 2 T are published and correct and hence a commit decision can be reached. 6: this.pk = pk 7: this.ms = ms(D) 8: this.state = P 9: end procedure 10: procedure AUTHORIZEREDEEM(Evidence e ) 11: requires (state == P and VerifyContracts(e)) 12: this.state = RD auth 13: end procedure 14: procedure AUTHORIZEREFUND 15: requires (state == P) 16: this.state = RF auth 17: end procedure 18: procedure VERIFYCONTRACTS(Evidence e) 19: if e validates all the smart contracts in AC 2 T (Check Section 4.3 for details) then SC w = retrieveSC(bc, bid, tid) 3: this.rd = this.rf = (SC w , d) 4: super(r, this.rd, this.rf) // parent constructor 5: end procedure 6: procedure ISREDEEMABLE(Evidence e) 7: if e validates that SC w 's state is RD auth and and that SC w 's state update is at depth ≥ d then 
Cross-Chain Evidence Validation
This section explains different techniques for the miners of one blockchain, the validators, to validate the publishing and verify the state of a smart contract deployed in another blockchain, the validated. The AC 3 WN protocol leverages these techniques in two protocol functions: 1) VerifyContracts in Algorithm 3 and 2) IsRedeemable/IsRefundable in Algorithm 4. In VerifyContracts, the miners of the witness network need to validate the publishing of all smart contracts in the AC 2 T in the blockchains where asset transfers occur. In addition, the miners need to verify that the state of all the published contracts is P and that the redemption and the refund of these smart contracts are conditioned on SC w 's states. Finally, the miners need to verify that for every smart contract in the AC 2 T, the sender, the recipient, and the asset match the specification of its corresponding edge e ∈ D. Similarly, in IsRedeemable/IsRefundable, miners of the blockchains where asset transfers occur need to verify that SC w 's state is either RD auth , in order to execute the redemption of a smart contract or RF auth , in order to execute the refund of a smart contract. In the former case, the miners of the witness network are the validators and the asset blockchains are the validated blockchains. In the latter case, the miners of the asset blockchains are the validators and the witness blockchain is the validated blockchain.
A simple but impractical solution is to require all the miners of every blockchain to serve as validators to all other blockchains. A blockchain validator maintains a copy of the validated blockchain and for every new mined block, a validator validates the mined block and adds it to its local copy of the validated blockchain. If all mining nodes mine one blockchain and validate all other blockchains, mining nodes can consult their local copies of these blockchains to validate the publishing and hence verify the state of any smart contract in any blockchain. If a participant needs the miners of the validator blockchain to validate the publishing of a smart contract in the validated blockchain, this participant submits evidence that comprises a block id and a transaction id of the smart contract in the validated blockchain to the miners of the validator blockchain. This evidence is easily verified by the mining node of the validator blockchain by consulting their copy of the validated blockchain. However, this full replication of all the blockchains in all the mining nodes is impractical. Not only does it require massive processing power to validate all blockchains, but also it requires significant storage and network capabilities at each mining node.
Alternatively, miners of one blockchain can run light nodes [9] of other blockchains. A light node, as defined in [9] , is a node that downloads only the block headers of a blockchain, verifies the proof of work of these block headers, and downloads only the blockchain branches that are associated with the transactions of interest to this node. For example, the mining nodes of the witness network can run light nodes for the Bitcoin network to verify the AC 2 T 's smart contracts in the Bitcoin network. A participant who wants the witness network mining nodes to validate a smart contract in the Bitcoin network submits evidence that consist of a block id and a transaction id of the smart contract in the Bitcoin network to the miners of the witness network. The miners of the witness network use their Bitcoin light nodes to validate the smart contract publishing and verify the smart contract state. This solution requires miners to mine for one blockchain and maintain light nodes for all other blockchains. Although the cost of maintaining a light node is much cheaper than maintaining a blockchain full copy, running a light node for all blockchains does not scale as the number of blockchains increases.
It is important to mention that the previous two techniques put the evidence validation responsibility of one blockchain on the miners of another blockchain. In addition, they require changes in the current infrastructure by requiring the miners of one blockchain to either maintain a full copy or a light node of other blockchains. Figure 6 : How miners of one blockchain could verify transactions in another blockchain without having a copy or a light node of this blockchain.
Our proposal: Another way to allow one blockchain, the validator, to validate the publishing and verify the state of a smart contract in another blockchain, the validated, is to push the validation logic into the code of a smart contract in the validator blockchain. A smart contract in the validator blockchain is deployed and stores the header of a stable block in the validated blockchain. A stable block is a block at depth d from the current head of the validated blockchain such that the probability of forking the blockchain at this block is negligible (i.e., a block at depth ≥ 6 in the Bitcoin blockchain [2]). A participant who deploys the smart contract in the validator blockchain stores the block header of a stable block of the validated blockchain as an attribute in the smart contract object in the validator blockchain. When the transaction or the smart contract of interest takes place in a block in the validated blockchain and after this block becomes a stable block, at depth d, a participant can submit evidence of the transaction occurrence in the validated blockchain to the miners of the validator blockchain. This evidence comprises the headers of all the blocks that follow the stored stable block in the smart contract of the validator blockchain in addition to the block where the transaction of interest took place. The evidence is submitted to the validator smart contract via a function call. This smart contract function validates that the passed headers follow the header of the stable block previously stored in the smart contract object and that the proof of work of each header is valid. In addition, the function verifies that the transaction of interest indeed took place and that the block of this transaction is stable and buried under d blocks in the validated blockchain. Figure 6 shows an example of a validator blockchain, blockchain 2 , that validates the occurrence of transaction T X 1 in the validated blockchain, blockchain 1 . In this example, there exists a smart contract SC that gets deployed in the current head block of blockchain 2 (labeled by number 2 in Figure 6 ). SC has an initial state S 1 and stores the header of a stable block, at depth d, in blockchain 1 (labeled by number 1). This header is represented by a red rectangle inside SC. SC's state is altered from S 1 to S 2 if evidence is submitted to miners of blockchain 2 that proves that T X 1 took place in blockchain 1 in some block after the stored stable block in SC. When T X 1 takes place in blockchain 1 (labeled by number 3) and its block becomes a stable block at depth ≥ d (labeled by number 4), a participant submits the evidence (labeled by number 5) to the miners of blockchain 2 through SC's function call (labeled by number 6). This function takes the evidence as a parameter and verifies that blocks in the evidence took place after the stored stable block in SC. This verification ensures that the header of each evidence block includes the hash of the header of the previous block starting from the stored stable block in SC. In addition, this function verifies the proof of work of each evidence's block header. Finally, the function validates that T X 1 took place in some block in the evidence blocks and that this block has already become a stable block. If this verification succeeds, the state of SC is altered from S 1 to S 2 . This technique allows miners of one blockchain to verify transactions and smart contracts in another blockchain without maintaining a copy of this blockchain. In addition, this technique puts the evidence validation responsibility on the developer of the validator smart contract.
AC 3 WN Analysis
This section analyzes the AC 3 WN protocol introduced in Section 4.2. First, we establish that the proposed protocol ensures atomicity. Then we analyze the scalability of the witness network and how it affects the scalability of the commitment protocol. Finally, we explain how this protocol extends the functionality of previous proposals in [16, 23] .
AC 3 WN: Atomicity Correctness Proof
Lemma 5.1 Assume no forks in the witness network, then the AC 3 WN protocol is atomic.
proof 5.2 Assume an AC 2 T executed by the AC 3 WN protocol and the atomicity of this transaction is violated. This atomicity violation implies that there exists two smart contract SC i and SC j in AC 2 T where SC i is redeemed and SC j is refunded. The redemption of SC i implies that there exists a block in the witness network where SC w 's state is RD auth while the refund of SC j implies that there exists a block in the witness network where SC w 's state is RF auth . Since SC w is programmed to allow only the state transitions either from P to RD auth or from P to RF auth , the two function calls to alter SC w 's state from P to RD auth and from P to RF auth cannot take effect in one block. Miners of the witness network shall accept one and reject the other. Therefore, these two state changes must be recorded in two separate blocks. As there exists no forks in the witness network, one of these two blocks must happen before the other. This implies that either SC w 's state is altered from RD auth in one block to RF auth in a following block or altered from RF auth in one block to RD auth in a following block. However, only the state transitions from P to RD auth or from P to RF auth are allowed and no other state transition is permitted leading to a contradiction.
Lemma 5.3 Let be a negligible probability of forks in the permissionless witness network, then AC 3 WN protocol is atomic with a probability 1 − . proof 5.4 Assume an AC 2 T executed by the AC 3 WN protocol and the atomicity of this transaction is violated with a probability p >>> . This atomicity violation implies that there exists two smart contract SC i and SC j in AC 2 T where SC i is redeemed and SC j is refunded. The redemption of SC i implies that there exists a block in the witness network where SC w 's state is RD auth while the refund of SC j implies that there exists a block in the witness network where SC w 's state is RF auth . As SC w 's states RD auth and RF auth are conflicting states, this implies that the block where SC w 's state update to RD auth occurs must exist in a fork from the block where SC w 's state update to RF auth occurs. The atomicity violation of the AC 2 T with a probability p implies that the fork probability in the witness network must be p leading to a contradiction.
The Scalability of AC 3 WN
One important aspect of AC 3 protocols is scalability. Does using a permissionless network of witnesses to coordinate AC 2 Ts limit the scalability of the AC 3 WN protocol? In this section, we argue that the answer is no. To explain this argument, we first develop an understanding of the properties of executing AC 2 Ts and the role of the witness network in executing AC 2 Ts.
An AC 2 T is a distributed transaction that consists of sub-transactions. Each sub-transaction is executed in a blockchain. An AC 3 protocol coordinates the atomic execution of these sub-transactions across several blockchains. An AC 3 protocol must ensure an atomic execution of the distributed transaction. This atomic execution of a distributed transaction requires the ACID [13, 15] execution of every sub-transaction in this distributed transaction in addition to the atomic execution of the distributed transaction itself. The ACID execution of a sub-transaction executed within a single blockchain is guaranteed by the miners of this blockchain. Miners use many techniques including mining, verification, and the miner's rationale to join the longest chain in order to implement ACID executions of transactions within a single blockchain. The atomicity of the distributed transaction is the responsibility of the distributed transaction coordinator. Therefore, the main role of the witness network in the AC 3 WN protocol is to ensure the atomicity of the AC 2 T. Since the atomicity coordination of AC 2 Ts is embarrassingly parallel, different witness network can be used to coordinate different AC 2 Ts.
Assume two concurrent AC 2 Ts, t 1 and t 2 . The atomic execution of t 1 does not require any coordination with the atomic execution of t 2 . Each AC 2 T requires its witness network to ensure that either all sub-transactions in the AC 2 T are executed or none of them is executed. Therefore, t 1 and t 2 do not have to be coordinated by the same witness network. t 1 can be coordinated by one witness network while t 2 can be coordinated by another witness network. If t 1 and t 2 conflict at the sub-transaction level, this conflict is resolved by the miners of the blockchain where these sub-transactions are executed. Therefore, using a permissionless witness network to coordinate AC 2 Ts does not limit the scalability of the AC 3 WN protocol. Different permissionless networks are used to coordinate different AC 2 Ts. For example, the Bitcoin network can be used to coordinate t 1 while the Ethereum network can be used to coordinate t 2 . Once a performance bottleneck is detected in a permissionless witness network, other permissionless networks can be potentially used to coordinate other AC 2 Ts. This ensures that the transaction throughput of an AC 3 protocol is only bounded by the transaction throughput of the blockchains used to exchange the assets in an AC 2 T but not the witness network.
Handling Complex AC
2 T Graphs One main improvement of the AC 3 WN protocol over the state-of-the-art AC 3 protocols in [16, 23] is its ability to coordinate the atomic execution of AC 2 Ts with complex graphs. This improvement is achieved because the AC 3 WN protocol does not depend on the rational behavior of the participants in the AC 2 T to ensure atomicity. Instead, the protocol depends on a permissionless network of witnesses to coordinate the atomic execution of AC 2 Ts. Once the participants agree on the AC 2 T graph and register it in the smart contract SC w in the witness network, participants cannot violate atomicity as the commit and the abort decisions are decided by the state of SC w . The state transitions of SC w are witnessed and verified by the miners of the witness network. Therefore, the publishing order of the smart contracts in the AC 2 T cannot result in an advantage to any coalition among the participants. Participants can concurrently publish their smart contracts in the AC 2 T, both in Figures 4 and 7 , without worrying about the maliciousness of any participant. Figure 7 illustrates two complex graph examples that either cannot be atomically executed by the protocols in [16, 23] or require additional mechanisms and protocol modifications to be atomically executed. These graphs appear in supply-chain applications. Both Nolan's and Herlihy's single leader protocol require the AC 2 T graph to be acyclic once the leader node is removed. Therefore, both protocols fail to execute the transaction graph shown in Figure 7a . Removing any node from the graph in Figure 7a still results in a cyclic graph. Herlihy presents a multi-leader protocol in [16] to handle cyclic graphs. However, both Nolan's and Herlihy's protocols fail to handle disconnected graphs similar to the graph shown in Figure 7b . On the other hand, the AC 3 WN protocol ensures the atomic execution of AC 2 Ts irrespective of the AC 2 T's graph structure.
Evaluation
This section analytically compares the performance and the overhead of the AC 3 WN protocol presented in Section 4.2 to the state-of-the-art atomic swap protocol presented by Herilhy in [16] . First, we compare the latency of AC 2 Ts as the diameter of the transaction graph D increases in Section 6.1. Then, the monetary cost overhead of using a permissionless network of witnesses to coordinate the AC 2 T is analyzed in Section 6.2. Afterwards, an analysis on how to choose the witness network is developed in Section 6.3. Finally, an analysis of the AC 2 T throughput as the witness network is chosen from the top-4 permissionless cryptocurrencies, sorted by market cap, is presented in Section 6.4.
Latency
The AC 2 T latency is defined as the difference between the timestamp t s when an AC 2 T is started and the timestamp t c when the AC 2 T is completed. t s marks the moment when participants in the AC 2 T start to agree on the AC 2 T graph D. t c marks the completion of all the asset transfers in the AC 2 T by redeeming all the smart contracts in AC 2 T.
Let ∆ be enough time for any participant to publish a smart contract in any permissionless blockchain, or to change a smart contract state through a function call of this smart contract, and for this change to be publicly recognized [16] . On the other hand, the AC 3 WN protocol has four phases: the witness network smart contract deployment phase, the AC 2 T smart contract parallel deployment phase, the witness network smart contract state change phase, and the AC 2 T smart contract parallel redemption phase. The witness network smart contract deployment requires the deployment of the smart contract SC w in the witness network resulting in a latency of ∆. The AC 2 T smart contract parallel deployment requires the parallel deployment of all smart contracts, N, in the AC 2 T resulting in a latency of ∆. The witness network smart contract state change requires a state change in SC w either from P to RD auth or from P to RF auth through SC w 's Redeem or Refund function calls resulting in a latency of ∆. Finally, the AC 2 T smart contract parallel redemption requires the parallel redemption of all smart contracts, N, in the AC 2 T resulting in a latency of ∆. The overall latency of an AC 2 T that uses this protocol equals to the latency summation of these four phases 4 · ∆. Figure 9 visualizes the four phases of the AC 3 WN protocol where time advances from left to right. As shown, all smart contracts in the AC 2 T are parallelly deployed and parallelly redeemed resulting in an overall latency of 4 · ∆. Figure 10 compares the overall AC 2 T latency in ∆s resulting from Herlihy's protocol in [16] and the AC 3 WN protocol as the transaction graph diameter, Diam(D) increases. As shown, the AC 3 WN protocol achieves a constant latency of 4 · ∆ irrespective of the transaction graph diameter value while Herlihy's protocol achieves a linear latency with respect to the transaction graph diameter value. Note that the smallest transaction graph consists of two nodes and two edges and hence the graph diameter in Figure 10 starts at 2. 
Cost Overhead
This section analyzes the monetary cost overhead of the AC 3 WN protocol in comparison to Herlihy's atomic swap protocol in [16] . As explained in Section 2, miners charge end-users a fee for every smart contract deployment and every smart contract function call that results in a smart contract state change. This fee is necessary to incentivize miners to add smart contracts and append smart contract state changes to their mined blocks. As shown in Figures 8  and 9 , both protocols deploy a smart contract for every edge e ∈ E where E is the edge set of the AC 2 T graph D. This results in the deployment of N = |E| smart contracts in the smart contract deployment phase of both protocols. In addition, both protocols invoke a redemption or a refund function call for every deployed smart contract in the AC 2 T resulting in N function calls. However, the AC 3 WN protocol requires to deploy an additional smart contract SC w in the witness network in addition to an additional function call to change SC w 's state either from P to RD auth or from P to RF auth . The cost of SC w deployment and SC w state transition function call comprises the monetary cost overhead of the AC 3 WN protocol. Let f d be the deployment fee of any smart contract SC i ∈ AC 2 T and f f c be the function call fee of any smart contract function call. Then, the overall AC 2 T fee of Herlihy's protocol is N · (f d + f f c ) while the overall AC 2 T fee of the AC 3 WN protocol is (N + 1) · (f d + f f c ). This analysis shows that AC 3 WN imposes a monetary cost overhead of 1 N the transaction fee of Herilhy's protocol assuming equal deployment and functional call fees for all the smart contracts in the AC 2 T.
But, How much does it cost in dollars to deploy a smart contract and make a smart contract function call? The answer is, it depends. Many factors affect a smart contract fee such as the length of the smart contract and the average transaction fee in the smart contract's blockchain [6, 27] . Ryan [27] shows that the cost of deploying a smart contract with a similar logic to SC w 's logic in the Ethereum network costs approximately $4 when the ether to USD rate is $300. Currently, this costs approximately $2 assuming the current ether to USD rate of $140.
Choosing the Witness Network
This section develops some insights on how to choose the witness network for an AC 2 T. This choice has to consider the risk of choosing different permissionless blockchain networks as the witness of an AC 2 T and the relationship between this risk and the value of the assets exchanged in this AC 2 T. As the state of the witness smart contract SC w determines the state of an AC 2 T, forks in the witness network present a risk to the atomicity of the AC 2 T. A fork in the witness network where one block has SC w 's state of RD auth and another block has SC w 's state of RF auth might result in an atomicity violation leading to an asset loss of some participants in the AC 2 T. To overcome possible violation, our AC 3 WN protocol does not consider a block where SC w 's state is either RD auth or RF auth as a commit or an abort evidence until this block is buried under d blocks in the witness network. This technique of resolving forks by waiting is presented in [22] and used by Pass and Shi in [25] to eliminate uncertainty of recently mined blocks. This fork resolution technique is efficient as the probability of eliminating a fork within d blocks is sufficiently high.
However, a malicious participant in an AC 2 T could fork the witness blockchain for d blocks in order to steal the assets of other participants in the AC 2 T. To execute this attack, a malicious participant rents computing resources to execute a 51% attack on the witness network. The cost of an hour of 51% attack for different cryptocurrency blockchains is presented in [7] . If the cost of running this attack for d blocks is less than the expected gains from running the attack, a malicious participant is incentivized to act maliciously.
To prevent possible maliciousness, the cost of running a 51% attack on the witness network for d blocks must be set to exceed the potential gains of running the attack. Let V a be the value of the potentially stolen assets if the attack succeeds. Also, let C h be the hourly cost of a 51% attack on the witness network. Finally, let d h be the expected number of mined blocks per hour for the witness blockchain (e.g., d h = 6 blocks / hour for the Bitcoin blockchain). The value d must be set to ensure that V a is less than the cost of running the attack for d blocks 
Throughput
The throughput of the AC 2 Ts is the number of transactions per second (tps) that could be processed assuming that every AC 2 T spans a fixed set of blockchains and is witnessed by a fixed witness blockchain. For an AC 2 T that spans multiple blockchains, the throughput is bounded by the slowest involved blockchain in the AC 2 T including the witness network. Let tps i be the throughput of blockchain i. The throughput of the AC 2 Ts that span blockchains i, j, .., n and are witnessed by the blockchain w equals to min(tps i , tps j .., tps n , tps w ).
Blockchain tps Blockchain tps 1) Bitcoin 7 3) Litecoin 56 2) Ethereum 25 4) Bitcoin Cash 61 Table 1 : The throughput in tps of the top-4 permissionless cryptocurrencies sorted by their market cap [24] . Table 1 shows the transaction throughput of the top-4 permissionless cryptocurrencies sorted by their market cap. An example AC 2 T that exchange assets among Ethereum and Litecoin blockchains and is witnessed by the Bitcoin network achieves a throughput of 7. The witness network should be chosen from the set of involved blockchains (Litecoin and Ethereum in this example) to avoid limiting the transaction throughput.
Conclusion
This paper presents AC 3 WN, the first decentralized Atomic Cross-Chain Commitment protocol that ensures the all-ornothing atomicity semantics even in the presence of participant crash failures and network delays. Unlike in [16, 23] where the protocol correctness mainly relies on participants rational behaviour, AC 3 
